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FOR ARRESTEE DNA SAMPLING
Corey Preston*
The scene has become indelible in our cultural consciousness: a suspected criminal
is pulled away from the mean streets, dragged by his collar “downtown” and tossed into
a neon-lit room.  He hands over his belongings with a menacing smirk and sneers while
the camera captures a mug shot that would make his mother shudder.  But then the pad
of ink comes out, and a flicker of uncertainty crosses his face.  As each print is taken,
we see him replaying the night before, straining to remember just what he had touched
and with which hand, cursing himself for neglecting to wear gloves.1
In just the past year, federal courts have begun to grapple with whether we should
add a new step to this iconic scene: whether DNA sampling, like fingerprinting, should
become a routine part of booking procedures upon arrest.  The first courts to rule on the
constitutionality of arrestee DNA statutes have split on the issue.  A United States
District Court in Pennsylvania2 and the Court of Appeals of Minnesota3 have ruled
that arrestee DNA sampling statutes are an unconstitutional encroachment on Fourth
Amendment privacy rights.  Conversely, a District Court in California,4 in a decision
recently affirmed by the Ninth Circuit,5 and the Virginia Supreme Court6 have ruled
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1 See THE WRONG MAN (Warner Bros. Pictures 1956). The booking and fingerprinting
scene in Alfred Hitchcock’s dark thriller is notably grim, an ironic inversion of the classic scene
outlined above. Peter Fonda’s character is an innocent man, and his reactions while being finger-
printed vacillate between confusion and horror, yet the police see only the hardened, smug
criminal described above. This theme of Hitchcock’s film, the idea that even an innocent man
with nothing to hide has something to fear, will be a discussion point throughout this Note.
2 United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
3 In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
4 United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903 (E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 2010 WL 3554049
(9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2010).
5 Shortly before the publication of this Note, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the District Court’s decision in Pool. United States v. Pool, 2010 WL 3554049 (9th Cir. Sept.
14, 2010). The Court of Appeals decision did not deviate significantly from the District
Court’s decision, id., and this Note will focus primarily on the language and analysis of the
District Court.
6 Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702 (Va. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S.
1054 (2008).
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that DNA sampling represents the natural next step, from routine fingerprinting, in
identification technology, and is, thus, constitutional.
While these rulings are merely opening salvos in what seems likely to become
a broad judicial discussion of arrestee DNA sampling,7 they effectively outline the
probable parameters of the constitutional argument.  The courts upholding arrestee
DNA sampling statutes have relied heavily on the argument that DNA sampling is
merely a harmless “technological progression” from fingerprinting8—no more intrusive
and no more objectionable—in order to circumvent Fourth Amendment concerns.9 
This analogy certainly makes intuitive sense, but with a close analysis of the differences
between DNA and fingerprint testing, both procedurally and substantively, the analogy
falls apart.
Our intuitive acceptance of fingerprinting as a routine part of criminal booking
stems from the simplicity the process promises.  The guilt, and resultant fear of de-
tection, we project on the arrested rogue described above stems from a basic linear
logical progression: if the man is guilty, fingerprint evidence offers a tangible—some
would say indisputable10—link between an individual’s body and the physical evidence
left at a crime scene.11  The opposite, then, also becomes intuitive: if he has nothing to
hide, he has nothing to fear.12  These same intuitions undoubtedly inform our cultural
7 To date, twenty-one states have enacted some form of DNA arrestee statute, making the
issue ripe for judicial consideration. State Laws on DNA Data Banks: Qualifying Offenses,
Others Who Must Provide Sample, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://
www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/civilandcriminaljustice/statelawsondnadatabanks/tabid/12737/
default.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2010).
8 Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 910.
9 Id. at 910–14. The many Fourth Amendment privacy concerns surrounding arrestee DNA
sampling will be discussed, at length, throughout this Note, but particularly in Part II.B. Pool also
addresses, and rebuts, a Fifth Amendment Due Process argument suggesting that an indepen-
dent judicial inquiry into whether cause exists to take a DNA sample, id. at 914, and an Eighth
Amendment claim arguing that DNA sampling is an impermissible condition of bail, id. at 915.
The Pool court responds to both challenges by reiterating its analysis of the Fourth Amendment
challenge, id. at 914–15, but it is worth noting that other constitutional challenges to arrestee
DNA sampling have been posited.
10 See SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL
IDENTIFICATION 4 (2001) [hereinafter COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES] (noting that the “fundamental
reliability” of fingerprint evidence has never been successfully challenged).
11 See id.
12 Even when the fingerprints of the accused are wholly irrelevant to his case, for example
a suspect arrested for tax fraud or drunken disorderly conduct, we still countenance his finger-
printing. A 2001 report from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, a component of the Department of
Justice, found that 94 percent of adults believed the practice of collecting fingerprints upon
arrest to be either “very acceptable” (78 percent), or “somewhat acceptable” (16 percent).
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD USES
OF CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION, 43 (2001), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/pauchi.pdf.
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feelings about the new “great science of identification,”13 DNA evidence, which
has quickly developed an even stronger air of infallibility than fingerprinting in the
public consciousness.14
But the establishment, almost a century ago,15 of fingerprinting as a part of routine
booking procedures had little to do with these cultural intuitions.16  Rather, routine
fingerprinting arose out of a legitimate law enforcement need to definitively identify
criminal suspects during an era when identity could easily be disguised.17  The analogy
between DNA sampling and fingerprinting ignores this history, and the fact that no
similar need for DNA sampling exists today.  Furthermore, the “technological pro-
gression” argument ignores the obvious conclusion that with “progression” comes
legitimate substantive differences between the two types of evidence, and the intrusions
on privacy those differences represent.18
A fair and full analysis of these two key differences between DNA sampling and
fingerprinting undermines both frameworks by which courts can find a suspicion-
less search “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.19  Moreover, in ignoring these
13 A 1911 New York Times article coined this phrase, promising that fingerprinting would
be the “great science” for untold years to come. Keeping Track of the Criminal By His Finger
Prints: The Wonderful Art, Long Used in China, Rapidly Being Adopted by the Police of This
Country, with the New York Force Leading, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1911 (Sunday Magazine), at
12 [hereinafter Keeping Track of the Criminal].
14 In fact, a Gallup poll in 2005 found that 85 percent of Americans believed DNA evidence
to be either completely reliable (27 percent of those polled), or very reliable (58 percent of re-
spondents). If anything, the poll found, we already accept DNA testing as more definitive than
fingerprinting, which only 69 percent of Americans found to be either completely reliable (16
percent) or very reliable (53 percent). See Darren K. Carlson, Americans Conclusive About
DNA Evidence, GALLUP, Nov. 15, 2005, http://www.gallup com/poll/19915/americans-con
clusive-about-dna-evidence.aspx.
15 Simon A. Cole, Fingerprint Identification and the Criminal Justice System: Historical
Lessons for the DNA Debate, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY
OF JUSTICE 63, 71–72 (David Lazer ed., 2004) [hereinafter Cole, Fingerprint Identification]
(noting that routine fingerprinting became standard procedure throughout the United States
following the First World War).
16 This is not to say that these intuitions did not exist; they clearly did. See, e.g., Keeping
Track of the Criminal, supra note 13 (“Guilty men have grown to dread the finger prints.”).
17 While the historic reasoning for routine fingerprinting is sound, one issue that will be dis-
cussed in this Note is the lack of a firm judgment from any court regarding fingerprinting and
the Fourth Amendment. See infra Part IV. While courts in the middle of the 20th Century did
examine the constitutionality of fingerprinting, they did not directly discuss privacy concerns,
but rather more colloquial complaints such as the public humiliation associated with finger-
printing. See, e.g., State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 66 N.E.2d 755 (Ind. 1946).
18 See infra Part II.B.1–2 (discussing the substantive differences between fingerprint evi-
dence and DNA samples).
19 See infra Part III (applying the differences between DNA sampling and fingerprinting to
the “totality of circumstances” framework for allowing a suspicion-less search, and the “special
needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment).
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important differences, the technical progression argument becomes wholly reliant on
cultural intuitions.  The line between the merely accused and the legally guilty is con-
tinually blurred by cultural perceptions, and our courts have historically gone to great
lengths to, at least in the courtroom, counteract this blurring.20  Yet the courts that
have upheld arrestee DNA sampling statutes have enthusiastically embraced just such
a blurring.21
This Note will argue, in part, that the rulings of courts upholding arrestee DNA
sampling statutes represent a surrender to cultural intuitions regarding DNA evidence. 
The promise of a massive DNA database, a revolutionary law enforcement tool, is a
powerful one, and the first courts to uphold arrestee DNA sampling have allowed this
promise to cloud their legal judgment.  These courts have shrouded the argument for
constitutionality in the precedential value of routine fingerprinting,22 but, as this Note
will make clear, that analogy rings false.
Part I of this Note will look at the basic Fourth Amendment framework for analysis
of the constitutionality of DNA sampling statutes.  Part II will apply that framework to
the strained analogy between fingerprinting and DNA sampling through analysis of the
history of fingerprinting in the United States.  Part III will argue that neither a totality
of circumstances test, nor a special needs analysis, can lead to a finding of constitu-
tionality without the false support of the faulty fingerprinting analogy.  Finally, Part
IV will acknowledge that the faulty fingerprinting analogy is fueled in part by the fact
that routine fingerprinting, and the use of arrestee fingerprints for broad investigative
purposes, has never been subjected to serious judicial scrutiny.  In fact the strongest
argument for arrestee DNA testing stems from this lack of clear precedent; by not
explicitly rejecting the use of arrestee fingerprints in databases, courts have implicitly
opened the door for a “progression” to arrestee DNA sampling.  However, Part IV
will demonstrate that this argument, too, ignores a deep history of both judicial and
societal wariness of routine arrestee fingerprinting as a broad investigative tool.  If
anything, the judiciary’s failure to define the parameters of routine fingerprinting, its
silent acquiescence to what has long been perceived as a boon for law enforcement,
should serve as a warning for courts grappling with arrestee DNA statutes.
This Note will conclude that routine fingerprinting—its history and its status in
our society today—does far more to undermine the case for arrestee DNA sampling
than it does to support it.  Absent the intuitive, but ultimately false, analogy to routine
fingerprinting, the argument for arrestee DNA sampling rests almost exclusively on
20 The most obvious example of this is our intuitive suspicion of a criminal defendant’s si-
lence at trial, and our judicial system’s requirement that this silence does not become prejudicial.
21 In fact, both the Pool and Anderson courts couched their rulings in the questionable
assertion of a lesser privacy right for arrested individuals. See United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp.
2d 903, 910–12 (E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 2010 WL 3554049 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2010); Anderson
v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 705 (Va. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1054 (2008).
22 See, e.g., Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903.
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cultural intuitions.  We perceive DNA evidence as the next great crime-fighting science,
and therefore the grizzled, hardened criminal above has nothing to fear, so long as he
has nothing to hide.  This Note will argue that, even with nothing to hide, that man has
reason to fear, and that courts should strike down arrestee DNA statutes as an uncon-
stitutional search under the Fourth Amendment.
I. THE BASIC FOURTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK
The Fourth Amendment promises protection of individuals from “unreasonable
searches and seizure,” unless probable cause has been established, and the particularities
of the person and/or place to be searched are clearly delineated.23  Courts have consis-
tently found both methods for collecting DNA samples, drawing blood24 and swabbing
cells from an individual’s mouth,25 to be a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.  The
question for the courts then becomes whether that search is “reasonable?”  For broad
law enforcement searches, absent any individualized suspicion, courts have carved
out two potential exceptions by which DNA sampling could be deemed a “reasonable
search” under the Fourth Amendment.
The “totality of circumstances” test requires balancing the degree of intrusion on
an individual’s privacy and the legitimate government interest that intrusion serves.26 
The slightly more arduous “special needs” test, on the other hand, requires a showing
that the intrusion serves a special need beyond typical law enforcement needs, which
make the probable cause requirement impractical.27
In uniformly upholding various statutes mandating collection from convicted
individuals against Fourth Amendment challenges, a majority of circuits have used
23 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (finding that drug
and alcohol testing through blood samples by Federal Railroad Administration did involve a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment); see also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973)
(finding that a search of the suspect’s fingernails was a physical examination beyond charac-
teristics that are “constantly exposed to the public” and constituted a search).
25 Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied sub nom. Boulineau
v. Donald, 546 U.S. 820 (2005) (extending the term “search” to include the taking of saliva
samples from the inside of an individual’s mouth).
26 See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (finding a police high-
way sobriety checkpoint constitutional because the state interest in curbing drunk driving out-
weighed the relatively slight intrusion on motorists).
27 See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873–77 (1987) (finding that a probation
officer’s warrantless search of a probationer’s home based on a tip from another officer met the
special needs test, as seeking a warrant for the search was impractical); see also New Jersey
v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 351–52 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stressing that a totality of
circumstances test should be the exception, not the rule, and that a special needs test—based
firmly on the impracticality of a warrant or probable cause requirement—suffices to allow the
searching of school students absent a warrant).
480 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:475
the totality of circumstances framework.28  In analyzing the degree of intrusion on
the individual, many of these courts leaned heavily on the precedent of routine finger-
printing as a similarly minor intrusion,29 with the caveat that, as convicted criminals,
the individuals being subjected to DNA sampling have a “diminished expectation of
privacy.”30  While at least one early DNA court hinted at a diminished expectation of
privacy when a person is not yet convicted, but merely arrested,31 the convicted status
of the subjects of DNA testing in each case was definitive.32
The three circuits that have rejected Fourth Amendment challenges based on the
special needs test have similarly found fingerprinting to be a helpful analogy.33  For
instance, in evaluating the state need for DNA sampling, the Second Circuit in Nicholas
v. Goord noted that, despite the slightly more intrusive nature of drawing blood or
swabbing saliva, DNA collection plays “the same role as fingerprinting.”34  The
Goord court also dutifully noted that the plaintiffs’ status as convicted individuals
28 See Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2007) (referring to FBI DNA
database system as more efficient updating of fingerprint databasing in upholding collection
of samples from paroled offenders); United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924–25 (8th Cir.
2006) (upholding amendment of convicted individual’s probation orders to include mandatory
DNA collection, based on federal statute, for inclusion in DNA database), cert. denied, 549 U.S.
1044 (2006); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184–86 (3d Cir. 2005) (upholding
federal collection requirement for probationer), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006); Donald,
401 F.3d at 1280 (upholding DNA collection from incarcerated felons); Groceman v. United
States, 354 F.3d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2004) (upholding collection from incarcerated individuals);
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding DNA collection from
certain offenders on conditional release), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 924 (2005); Jones v. Murray,
962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding DNA collection from incarcerated individuals),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 (1992).
29 See, e.g., Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 185.
30 Id. at 177; see also Groceman, 354 F.3d at 413–14 (“Though, like fingerprinting,
collection of a DNA sample for purposes of identification implicates the Fourth Amendment,
persons incarcerated after conviction retain no constitutional privacy against their correct
identification.”).
31 See Murray, 962 F.2d at 306 (“[W]hen a suspect is arrested upon probable cause, his
identification becomes a matter of legitimate state interest and he can hardly claim privacy in
it. . . . While we do not accept even this small level of intrusion for free persons without Fourth
Amendment constraint . . . the same protections do not hold true for those lawfully confined to
the custody of the state.”).
32 Id. at 307 (“Thus, in the case of convicted felons . . . we find that the minor intrusion
caused by the taking of a blood sample is outweighed by Virginia’s interest . . . .”).
33 See Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 671–72 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 953
(2006); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132,
1146 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1083 (2003); see also United States v. Conley, 453
F.3d 674, 679–81 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding a DNA collection statute constitutional under both the
special needs and the totality of circumstances analysis).
34 Goord, 430 F.3d at 671.
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further minimized the intrusion.35  The Seventh Circuit, in Green v. Berge, inflated the
law enforcement need by finding DNA samples to be merely a “stronger” form of
identity verification than fingerprinting.36
The courts that have, to date, upheld arrestee DNA sampling statutes against Fourth
Amendment challenges have leaned heavily on the fingerprint analogies from convicted
DNA sampling cases.  To make this case, these courts have necessarily minimized the
focus in those earlier cases on the plaintiffs’ status as convicts.  For instance, a district
court in California in United States v. Pool37 recently became the first court to uphold
two federal provisions that require DNA sampling upon arrest.38  The court in Pool
pointed to DNA testing as a “technological progression” from fingerprinting39 which
serves the same valid state goals of determining definitive identification of criminal
suspects and poses, if anything, a lesser physical invasion than its forebearer.40  To
make the leap from testing convicted felons to testing arrested individuals, the Pool
court relied on the Virginia Supreme Court’s ruling in Anderson v. Commonwealth.41 
Anderson suggested that arrestee DNA testing was permissible based on arrested
individuals’ lessened right to privacy.42  This questionable and vague conclusion, based
on the sole federal circuit that declined to draw a clear line between the privacy rights
of the legally convicted and the merely accused,43 is one that will be discussed in
35 Id.; see also Berge, 354 F.3d at 678–79.
36 Berge, 345 F.3d at 679 (“[G]iven that DNA is the most reliable evidence of identifi-
cation—stronger even than fingerprints or photographs—we see no Fourth Amendment impedi-
ments . . . .”). The Berge court, it should be noted, was also careful to focus on the complaining
inmate’s convicted status. Id.
37 645 F. Supp. 2d 903 (E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d,  2010 WL 3554049 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2010).
38 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(A) (2006) (listing DNA sampling among the conditions of pretrial
release for individuals arrested and charged with certain crimes); 42 U.S.C. § 14135(a)
(2006) (granting the Attorney General authority to regulate and carry out DNA sampling from
individuals arrested for a federal offense).
39 Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 910.
40 See id. at 911 (noting the minimal invasive nature of DNA testing).
41 Id. (drawing upon Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702 (Va. 2007), cert. denied,
553 U.S. 1054 (2008)). The Anderson court upheld a state statute that authorized taking a
DNA sample from anyone convicted of a violent felony and noted: 
Fingerprinting an arrested suspect has long been considered a part of the routine
booking process. Similarly, the taking of a DNA sample by minimally intrusive
means is justified by the legitimate interest of the government in knowing for an ab-
solute certainty the identity of the person arrested, in knowing whether he is wanted
elsewhere, and in ensuring his identification in the event he flees prosecution.
Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 706 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42 Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 706 (“Like fingerprinting, the ‘Fourth Amendment does not
require an additional finding of individualized suspicion’ before a DNA sample can be taken.”
(quoting Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 (1992)).
43 The Murray court, among the first courts to rule in favor of a convicted felon DNA sam-
pling statute, has been the only court to hint that a diminished privacy expectation could be
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Part IV of this Note, and is an issue that seems certain to be controversial amongst
other courts.44
Putting this argument aside for now, the framework for both a totality of circum-
stances analysis, and a special needs analysis, of the constitutionality of pre-conviction
DNA sampling seems to invite two basic questions: first, to what degree is the sampling
intrusive on the individual; second, what is the government’s need for these intrusions? 
Courts using both tests have relied on the fingerprinting analogy to answer these ques-
tions, and Part II of this Note will examine the holes in that analogy through the lens of
these two questions.
II. GOVERNMENT NEED VERSUS DEGREE OF INTRUSION
A. A Historical Need, a Law Enforcement Convenience
Under both the totality of circumstances test and the special needs analysis, the
government need, or rationale, for an intrusion into individual privacy is a central issue. 
The argument for pre-conviction DNA sampling suggests that DNA testing is a techno-
logical progression from fingerprinting,45 merely a superior way to meet the same needs
that led to fingerprinting becoming a routine part of any arrest.46  This argument fails
by ignoring both the historical basis for routine fingerprinting and the simple fact that
the need for definitive identification that led to routine fingerprinting is already fully
met, making DNA sampling for that purpose wholly redundant.
l. “The Great Science of Identification”
Shortly following the turn of the nineteenth century, fingerprinting was hailed
as the ultimate bane to criminal existence,47 having led to heralded convictions in En-
gland48 and the United States.49  But these crime-solving successes aside, the real basis
extended to include not just convicted individuals, but also anyone subject to the custody of
the state. Murray, 962 F.2d at 306.
44 In fact, a federal district court in United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597 (W.D.
Pa. 2009), and the Minnesota Court of Appeals in In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484
(Minn. Ct. App. 2006), have both strongly criticized this reasoning in striking down arrestee
DNA sampling statutes.
45 United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903, 910 (E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 2010 WL 3554049
(9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2010).
46 Id. (citing United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 185 (3rd Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
548 U.S. 919 (2006)).
47 See Keeping Track of the Criminal, supra note 13.
48 COLIN BEAVEN, FINGERPRINTS: THE ORIGINS OF CRIME DETECTION AND THE MURDER
CASE THAT LAUNCHED FORENSIC SCIENCE (2001) (exploring the investigation into and con-
viction of two brothers for the murder of an elderly couple in a London suburb).
49 See People v. Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077 (Ill. 1911). Thomas Jennings of Illinois was the
first person convicted of murder in a U.S. court based, in part, on fingerprint evidence. See COLE,
SUSPECT IDENTITIES, supra note 10, at 159–60.
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for the inclusion of fingerprinting in common booking practices was a simple adminis-
trative need, epitomized in the legend of Will and William West.50  While accounts of
the story differ, the basic premise is that one Will West was brought to Leavenworth
Prison in Kansas and, upon processing, claimed to have never been incarcerated in the
prison before.51  When prison officials examined his Bertillon measurements,52 they
were convinced he was lying until they discovered that the prison already housed a
William West who had identical Bertillon measurements to the new prisoner.53  The
prison found that fingerprints were the only reliable way to distinguish the two pris-
oners, and it became one of the first American penitentiary systems to install a finger-
print system in 1904.54
Although inconsistent retellings of the West story have raised questions as to its
veracity,55 the basic problem faced by Leavenworth was prevalent in all police agencies:
as criminal statutes evolved to include increased punishment for prior offenses, simply
identifying an individual was a challenge.56  With identification documents such
as passports lacking detailed descriptions and easily forged,57 and systems geared
50 See JOE NICKELL & JOHN F. FISCHER, CRIME SCIENCE: METHODS OF FORENSIC DETECTION
115 (1999).
51 Id.
52 The “Bertillon method,” founded by the French police officer Alphonse Bertillon,
involved measurements of an individual’s head and body, combined with photographs and
physical descriptions of tattoos and other identifying marks, to create a catalogue system for
identifying multiple offenders. Because it was believed that Bertillon measurements were unique
to all individuals, the system was popular in Europe and the United States from roughly 1884
until fingerprints proved more reliable in the early twentieth century. The primary downfalls of
the system were the complexity of the measuring process, and the fact that measurements of
individuals could change over time. See G. Larry Mays et al., Review Essay: DNA (Deoxyribo-
nucleic Acid) Evidence, Criminal Law, and Felony Prosecution: Issues and Prospects, 16 JUST.
SYS. J. 111, 112 (1992). See generally, HENRY T.F. RHODES, ALPHONSE BERTILLON: FATHER
OF SCIENTIFIC DETECTION (1956).
53 NICKELL & FISCHER, supra note 50, at 115.
54 MITCHEL P. ROTH, PRISONS AND PRISON SYSTEMS: A GLOBAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 159 (2006).
By 1907, Leavenworth had developed the largest fingerprint collection, roughly 20,000 prints,
in the United States. Id.
55 See, e.g., Robert D. Olsen, Sr., A Fingerprint Fable: The Will and William West Case,
IDENTIFICATION NEWS, Nov. 1987, http://www.scafo.org/library/110105.html (arguing that
the Leavenworth records do not indicate any confusion regarding either William West, who
was incarcerated and underwent Bertillon measurements in September of 1901, and Will West,
who was incarcerated and measured in May of 1903; both Wests were fingerprinted in October
of 1905). Nickell and Fischer suggest that Will West and William West were, in fact, identical
twins, which would account for much of the initial identity confusion. NICKELL & FISCHER,
supra note 50, at 115.
56 COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES, supra note 10, at 9–10 (discussing the emerging need,
beginning in the late eighteenth century, for some people, particularly criminals, to have “an
identity that existed outside the physical body, in the files and paper records of some gov-
ernment bureaucracy”).
57 Id. at 10.
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specifically towards criminals seriously flawed,58 the need for a legitimate identification
system was dire.59
A New York district court expressed that need in United States v. Kelly,60 an early
case looking specifically at the process of taking fingerprints as a part of routine
booking upon arrest.  The Kelly court commented that “names and appearances may
easily be assumed and changed and while, like everything else that is human, occasional
mistakes appear, it is exceedingly rare for this means of identification [fingerprinting]
to fail.”61  The District Court in Kelly stressed that the value of fingerprinting goes well
beyond mere evidentiary value at criminal trial, citing statistics finding that finger-
printing allowed for more than 103,000 positive identifications of prisoners in London
between 1901 and 1914, and more than 31,000 positive identifications in New York
City over a four-year period between 1911 and 1915.62
2. A Need Fulfilled
Compared to the dire need for effective identification tools facing law enforcement
in the early twentieth century, the need for DNA testing for basic identification pur-
poses today is diminutive.  Courts upholding statutes requiring DNA sampling from
arrested individuals have emphasized the need for “absolute certainty” in ensuring that
an arrested individual is who he says he is.63  This assertion is undermined by the fact
58 See id. at 11. Cole recounts one of the more feckless identification systems at the Penn-
sylvania Penitentiary in Philadelphia, which attempted to keep tabs on its massive prison popula-
tion through a detailed cataloguing system that included notation of birthplace, age, complexion,
hair color, eye color and stature, along with any identifying marks or tattoos. Despite the Peni-
tentiary’s dogged efforts, Cole notes, there was still “no way for a prison clerk to use a physical
feature to look up a prisoner’s name,” so that, “a prisoner using an alias, unless actually recog-
nized by a prison official, was shielded from identification.” Id.
59 See Pinkerton’s London Trip: American Detective Studies Fingerprint System at Scotland
Yard, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1911, at C4. This recounting of an American’s trip to London to
study fingerprint cataloguing, amusingly gives credit to Mr. Pinkerton for the “comparative
inactivity of American crooks in London” during his visit. Id.
60 51 F.2d 263, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 1931), rev’d, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932).
61 Id. The district court in Kelly found that fingerprinting was inappropriate because the State
lacked statutory authority. Id. The case was overturned on appeal, with the appeals court echoing
the district court’s understanding of fingerprinting as “a very certain means [of identification] . . .
especially important in a time when increased population and vast aggregations of people in
urban centers have rendered the notoriety of the individual in the community no longer a ready
means of identification.” United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1932).
62 United States v. Kelly, 51 F.2d 263, 265 (E.D.N.Y 1931).
63 Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 706 (Va. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1054
(2008). The Virginia Supreme Court in Anderson upheld a Virginia statute requiring DNA sam-
pling of any individual arrested for a violent crime. It based its ruling partially on the argument
that, while fingerprints can be a reliable means of making an identification, DNA is more re-
liable. Id. at 705.
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that there has never been a showing that an individual’s fingerprints can be altered,64
and by recent tests by scientists showing that DNA evidence can be successfully fabri-
cated.65  Even ignoring this evidence and granting the proposition that DNA sampling
may provide a higher degree of certainty in determining identity, the possibility that
a previously convicted felon in the modern world could simply lie away his identity
is extremely unlikely, considering the vastly stricter identification requirements present
in all aspects of everyday life.66
Furthermore, for the basic process of confirming and monitoring identities through
an interconnected database, fingerprinting remains as valid and efficient a process as
DNA collection and databasing.67  Although courts have questioned the reliability of
fingerprint evidence in recent years,68 these concerns have surrounded their reliability
as evidence—particularly the value of blurry partial prints left at crime scenes—not
their value as basic marks of identity.69  Since paper fingerprint files were first comput-
erized in the 1960s70 in systems such as the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (IAFIS), the reliability of fingerprinting as a means for assuring
the identity of an individual has only increased.71  While IAFIS is limited in its capacity
to produce “direct hits” when a particular set of prints is entered into the database,72
this limit is irrelevant to the process of verifying an arrested individual’s identity and
64 See NICKELL & FISCHER, supra note 50, at 116 (noting that even John Dillinger’s attempt
to surgically alter his fingerprints failed to erase them).
65 Israeli scientists successfully fabricated blood and saliva samples containing DNA from
a person other than the actual donor. Andrew Pollack, Scientists Show That It’s Possible to
Create Fake DNA Evidence, NY TIMES, Aug. 18, 2009, at D3.
66 For instance, requirements of identification for travel, banking and other necessities now
typically include state-issued photo identification. See, e.g., ID Requirements for Airport Check-
points, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/acceptable_documents.shtm
(last visited Nov. 17, 2010).
67 See INTERPOL EUROPEAN EXPERT GROUP ON FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION, METHOD
FOR FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION, May 2000, http://www.interpol.int/public/Forensic/finger
prints/WorkingParties/IEEGFI/ieegfi.asp (noting that fingerprints will remain a major forensic
tool for years to come). This INTERPOL report finds that the essential reliability of finger-
prints as identifiers is based on two axioms, that fingerprints are unique, and that they don’t
change over time. Id.
68 Jason Felch, Smudge Science, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2009, at A37.
69 Id. Felch notes that scientists generally agree with the age-old principle that no two
fingerprints are exactly alike, though he adds ominously that this assertion has gone rela-
tively unstudied. Id.
70 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT
IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS: TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY ISSUES 1 (1987) [hereinafter AFIS
POLICY].
71 Id. However, the full potential of computerized fingerprint databasing would not be
realized until the 1980s. Id.
72 AFIS systems generally narrow the database down to a handful of possible matches.
COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES, supra note 10, at 255.
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criminal history through fingerprints.73  In fact, the issue of fingerprint and DNA value
for “cold hits” in a database is a separate question altogether from the law enforce-
ment need that spawned the routine fingerprinting of individuals during booking.
DNA evidence undeniably offers considerable promise and potential for solving
crime, but to say that the need for routine DNA collection upon arrest is akin to, or
a natural progression from, the need for routine fingerprinting a century ago is mis-
guided. When fingerprinting became popularized in the early twentieth century, law
enforcement was desperate for some means of documenting and tracing the identi-
ties of convicted criminals.74  The only serious alternative to fingerprinting for crimi-
nal identification was the Bertillon method, which had proven both administratively
and scientifically suspect.75  Law enforcement faces no such challenges today,
precisely because fingerprinting remains an effective and efficient way to document
an individual’s identity.76
Admittedly, the value of routine fingerprinting as a tool for seeking “cold hits” with
unsolved cases has expanded with law enforcement’s ability to cross-reference and
search enormous databases.77  But the initial intent behind routine fingerprinting at
booking was aimed at merely identifying definitively arrested persons, and that
intent has been reflected in more recent case law regarding the constitutionality of
pre-conviction fingerprinting.78  To suggest that routine DNA sampling is merely a
natural progression from that aim ignores two critical facts: 1) fingerprinting remains
a viable, presumptively foolproof, method of establishing identity, and 2) arrested
individuals today are far less likely, and less able, to conceal their identity upon
arrest.  Acknowledging these facts, it seems reasonable to suggest what some courts
have acknowledged,79 that DNA sampling from arrestees has nothing to do with the
73 Mere identification from fingerprinting, in the context examined in United States v. Kelly,
55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932), involves only matching the name given by an arrested individual and
his or her fingerprints against prints already on file for that individual.
74 See Martine Kaluszynski, Republican Identity: Bertillonage as Government Technique,
in DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE PRACTICES IN THE
MODERN WORLD 123, 127 (Jane Caplan & John Torpey eds., 2001) (discussing precursors
to fingerprinting).
75 See id. at 131.
76 See COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES, supra note 10, at 4 (stating that there have been “no
successful challenges to [fingerprinting’s] reliability”).
77 IAFIS currently has more than 66 million subjects in its Criminal Master File, and can
process submissions for a database search in an average of ten minutes for a criminal request.
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://
www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/iafis.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2010) [hereinafter FBI IAFIS].
78 McGovern v. Van Riper, 54 A.2d 469 (N.J. Ch. 1947) (finding that the primary goal in
collecting fingerprints upon arrest was to definitively identify the individual to determine if he
had prior convictions, and to expedite recapture in case the individual were to escape).
79 In fact, the Virginia Supreme Court in Anderson qualified its platitudes about the need
for “absolute certainty” in identifying arrested individuals with the caveat that the routine taking
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original aims of fingerprinting and everything to do with an effort to grow DNA
databases in order to solve future crimes.
3. Casting a Wider Net
If DNA evidence can provide no practical net value to the process of identifying
and maintaining criminal histories of individuals beyond that already offered by finger-
printing, then what is its value in the context of routine booking procedures?
As the viability of DNA evidence has grown in the past twenty years, states have
sought, and courts have supported, the expansion of DNA databases to include samples
from more and more classes of individuals.80  Courts first upheld collection from
convicted, incarcerated felons,81 followed by collection from felons convicted of 
violent crimes on parole or supervised release,82 and ultimately collection from paroled
individuals convicted of any federal felony.83  State courts have mirrored federal
courts in this regard, and have further expanded collection by upholding collection
from individuals convicted of some misdemeanors,84 and individuals convicted of
certain sex offenses even after they have been released and have fulfilled state
supervision requirements.85
This steady expansion of DNA databases should be unsurprising, considering the
potential value to law enforcement and similar attempts to capitalize on the potential of
fingerprinting and expand fingerprint databases in the past.86  Still, the courts upholding
of fingerprints during booking, and thus the taking of DNA as well, is primarily aimed at solving
past and future crimes. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 705 (Va. 2007), cert.
denied, 553 U.S. 1054 (2008).
80 As of a September 2006 report from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, all fifty-five United
States jurisdictions (including all fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico,
federal offenders, and offenders charged by the Department of Defense) required databasing of
DNA samples for convicted sex offenders. More than fifty jurisdictions included DNA sampling
from individuals convicted of murder, offenses against children, kidnaping, assault and
battery, robbery and burglary. forty-four jurisdictions required DNA sampling from indi-
viduals convicted of any felony, and thirty-one jurisdictions as of 2006 had expanded their
database to include samples from juveniles. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, DNA FORENSICS: EXPANDING USES AND INFORMATION SHARING 2 (2006) [hereinafter
DNA FORENSICS].
81 See, e.g., Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977
(1992).
82 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 839 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 924
(2005).
83 See United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 950 (9th Cir. 2007).
84 See, e.g., State v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19 (Md. 2004) (upholding sampling of persons
convicted of certain burglary misdemeanors).
85 See, e.g., Good v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
86 See infra note 225 and accompanying text (discussing efforts of J. Edgar Hoover to
promote universal fingerprinting).
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these expansions have been careful to limit their scope.  Many courts have explained
the basic law enforcement “need” as an interest in dissuading and preventing recidi-
vism,87 a rationale that has been parroted by the Department of Justice,88 and that
clearly can only apply to convicted individuals.89  All courts upholding DNA sampling
of convicted individuals have stressed that their rulings apply only to convicted indi-
viduals, and reflect an interest in keeping track of those individuals, be it upon their
release, their escape, or merely throughout their incarceration.90
Based on these rationales, and solely in the context of post-conviction DNA
testing, the analogy to fingerprinting from a “need” standpoint is a good one.  The
historic need for fingerprinting is, in a sense, an inversion of the stated post-conviction
DNA testing need: keeping track of convicted criminals.91  The initial intent of routine
fingerprinting was primarily “archival,” an effort to ensure that arrested individuals
with prior convictions could not erase those previous crimes.92  But the analogy, for
purposes of discussing DNA sampling, is strictly dependant on dealing with convicted
individuals, a point ignored in both Anderson and Pool.
In upholding Virginia’s arrestee DNA collection statute, the Anderson court cited
a state interest in “maintaining a permanent record to solve other past and future
crimes.”93  This rationale was pulled directly from Jones v. Murray, but it lacked the
87 Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 310–11 (4th. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 (1992).
88 DNA FORENSICS, supra note 80, at 9–10. The Justice Department report uses recidivism
data to suggest that DNA sampling can have both a deterrent effect and lead to the solving of
more serious crimes. The report discusses the controversial “lesser offenses” initiative in New
York City, whereby law enforcement seeks DNA samples after convictions for minor property
crimes in hopes of prompting a database match with unsolved or future serious crimes, such as
murder or rape. The program identified a link between lesser offenses and open murder and rape
cases, and prompted an expansion of the city’s forensic program. Id.
89 After all, if an arrestee is presumed innocent, there can be no state interest in preventing
recidivism in the future until he is convicted.
90 See, e.g., United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315, 323 (D. Del. 2003) (“[T]he
ultimate goals of solving past and future criminal investigations, exonerating the innocent and
deterring recidivism.”), aff’d, 402 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2005).
91 Consider a story, relayed in a brief 1930 book published by the Finger Print Publishing
Association, in which convicted killer Luke O’Neill escaped police custody and altered his
physical appearance. T.G. COOKE, FINGERPRINTS SECRET SERVICE CRIME DETECTION 48–49
(1930). O’Neill, even after he was arrested on a burglary charge, continued “laughing at police,”
until he was taken to be fingerprinted, where “he became really alarmed.” Id. at 47. This need
to keep track of O’Neill via his fingerprints is at least somewhat analogous to the needs expressed
by the post-conviction DNA sampling courts.
92 Cole, Fingerprint Identification, supra note 15, at 83 (“In the 1930s, the primary appli-
cation of criminal identification databases was archival: linking individual suspects to their ‘true’
criminal histories so that they could be adjudicated with the highest degree of fairness (for them)
and safety (for society).”).
93 Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 705 (Va. 2007) (quoting Jones v. Murray,
962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992)), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1054 (2008).
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element of a need to monitor convicted criminals, and thus represented a far broader
“need” than those expressed in the post-conviction DNA cases.  The Anderson court
attempted to justify this need by relying on the fingerprint analogy.  Once probable
cause has been established for arrest, the court reasoned, the suspect’s identification
becomes a legitimate state interest, and that interest extends to collecting DNA evidence
for databasing purposes.94  The court suggested that DNA sampling upon arrest, “while
more revealing, is no different in character” than fingerprinting,95 and cited Murray,
again, to support this proposition.96
The Anderson court ignored the fact, however, that Murray was limited to the col-
lection of DNA samples from persons lawfully confined to prison, a crucial fact the
Murray court was careful to emphasize.97  While the Murray court remained notably
open to the possibility of a lesser expectation of privacy upon arrest, it also specifi-
cally pointed to case law that limited the intrusion of fingerprinting under the Fourth
Amendment.98  Furthermore the Murray court couched its decision in the fact that
Fourth Amendment protection applies less to those already convicted.99
The court in Pool, meanwhile, simply cited Anderson in finding that the “need”
for DNA sampling is analogous to fingerprinting as part of the routine booking pro-
cess.100  It too relied primarily on Murray, despite the Murray court’s emphasis on
the importance of conviction in the erosion of Fourth Amendment rights.101
4. Conclusions—Comparing “Need”
Ultimately, there is no denying that the “need” expressed in Anderson and Pool is
just that, a need.  But the issue of that need’s legitimacy, and its potency in the face of
real encroachments on the privacy rights of presumptively innocent individuals, is sig-
nificantly called into question when the false analogy to fingerprinting is accepted
as such.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 705.
96 Murray, 962 F.2d at 306 (noting that even a tax evader is fingerprinted to further the
State’s legitimate interest in identification).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 306–07 (citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (finding that the
Fourth Amendment protected against fingerprinting when a number of black youths were
targeted by police without individualized suspicion)).
99 Murray, 962 F.2d at 307 n.2.
100 United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903 (E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 2010 WL 3554049
(9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2010). In affirming the District Court in Pool, the Ninth Circuit stressed the
arguably greater accuracy of DNA identification. United States v. Pool, 2010 WL 3554049
at *8 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2010). The Ninth Circuit also made a case for monitoring the accused
during the period between arrest and trial—determining if the individual has committed prior
unsolved crimes is critical to deciding whether, and under what conditions, to release the
individual pre-trial. Id.
101 Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 910–11.
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To simply accept the need for “routine” DNA sampling upon arrest as a natural
progression from the need for routine fingerprinting is erroneous.  Fingerprinting his-
torically served a specific administrative need—the need to definitively establish the
identity of arrested individuals when identities could easily be falsified.102  But, that
specific need is no better met by the innovation of DNA sampling.  If anything, DNA
is arguably less reliable as a basic identification system.103
The comparison between the need for fingerprinting and DNA sampling in the
post-conviction DNA sampling cases is probably best treated as no more than a helpful
comparison.  A case can certainly be made that routine fingerprinting was meant to
be “archival,” an effort to link convicted felons, released and subsequently arrested
again, to their true criminal histories.104  This same need to monitor convicted criminals
is inherent in post-conviction DNA statutes, but the precedential value is lost in the non-
criminal context.
If we take away any precedential value of the fingerprinting comparison and
acknowledge it as false, then the rationale in Anderson and Pool comes down to a
simple call for continued expansion of DNA databases.  Although this “need” is cer-
tainly intuitively legitimate and reasonable—after all, if you’re arrested and you have
nothing to hide, what would you possibly have to fear?105—it loses significant weight
as a counter to the more drastic invasions of privacy it proposes.
After discussing the faulty comparison between fingerprinting and DNA sampling
as it relates to the invasion of the privacy prong of the Fourth Amendment analysis in
the following section, Part III will break down the full arguments in Anderson and Pool
to determine if, absent that comparison, those decisions can stand.
B. Untapped Potential, Privacy Fears
Much of the early judicial consideration of the “intrusion” of DNA sampling
focused on the physical intrusion—the drawing of blood or a swab of saliva from
inside the cheek.106  The broader concern for any advocate of civil liberties, however,
involves the immense potential, both real and perceived, that DNA samples carry.
1. The Classic Civil Liberties Argument
The genius of fingerprinting for identification purposes, according to forensic
expert Simon Cole, is that fingerprints have proven over time to offer no valuable or
102 See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.
103 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
104 Cole, Fingerprint Identification, supra note 15, at 83.
105 Based on the questionable assertion of lesser privacy rights for arrested individuals. See
United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903, 915 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (making the assertion that
arrestees have diminished privacy rights), aff’d 2010 WL 3554049 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2010).
106 See, e.g., Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 669 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S.
953 (2006).
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personal information beyond the mere identity of the individual they belong to.107  De-
spite substantial research seeking to prove a hereditary or racial link to fingerprints,
no such link has been found.108  This lack of depth in fingerprint evidence, Cole argues,
has been essential to its staying power as strong evidence of identification, in that
fingerprint experts asked to testify at criminal trial are not influenced by traits that may
indicate a particular type of suspect.109
DNA samples, alternatively, carry significant potential for revealing information
beyond mere identity,110 and the process of DNA databasing has led to significant
questions from civil liberties advocates regarding how databases would be protected
and the extent to which collection would be expanded.111  “[M]ight access to these
databases change in the future?” asks social psychologist and legal scholar Julie
Singer.112  “Could the information contained in these databases be exploited or used
in illegal or unethical ways?  Finally, might the government not stop at requiring
DNA tests of those arrested?  Might they someday require this submission of all its
citizens?”113  These concerns regarding access, exploitation and overreach have already
been argued in recent years,114 although proponents of expanded DNA databases point
to crime-solving successes to justify any expansion.115
Much of the recent argument has involved the potential “predictive value” of DNA,
and the debated contention that DNA collected for criminal identification purposes is
merely “junk DNA,” or DNA that does not contain key personal information regarding
107 COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES, supra note 10, at 101.
108 Id. at 103.
109 Id. at 101.
110 See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 842 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J.,
concurring) (“DNA stores and reveals massive amounts of personal, private data about that
individual, and the advance of science promises to make stored DNA only more revealing
in time.”), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 924 (2005).
111 See Julie A. Singer et al., The Impact of DNA and Other Technology on the Criminal
Justice System: Improvements and Complications, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 87 (2007).
112 Id. at 123.
113 Id. (citing Paul E. Tracy & Vincent Morgan, Big Brother and His Science Kit: DNA Data-
bases for 21st Century Crime Control?, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 339–40 (2002)).
114 For instance, in Orange County, California, the local District Attorney created his own
DNA database in order to circumvent federal and state evidentiary rules. Jason Felch & Maura
Dolan, A War for Control of Forensic Science, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, at A1. Felch and
Dolan also reported that the D.A. engaged in a power struggle with the local Sheriff over
control of the county’s DNA samples. Id.
115 For instance, one of the most controversial DNA search methods, a “familial search”
using a known DNA sample to match unsolved crimes to the sampled individual’s family
members recently yielded a major law enforcement coup, the arrest of a long-wanted serial
killer. Jennifer Steinhauer, ‘Grim Sleeper’ Arrest Fans Debate on DNA Use, N.Y. TIMES, July
9, 2010, at A14. While the two states that allow familial searches, Colorado and California,
strictly regulate their implementation, the process has nonetheless raised concerns with civil
liberties advocates. Id.
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genetic history.116  Cole argues that the potential “predictive value” of DNA has been
both overstated by civil libertarians seeking to limit DNA collection and understated
by proponents of increased collection.117  He concludes that the concern with DNA
databasing is that society will begin assigning “predictive value” to all DNA, leading
to subconscious, and erroneous, correlations between basic DNA types and perceived
criminal propensities.118  Ignoring the scientific argument for the moment, this possi-
bility that perceptions could play a role in the “intrusion” inherent in DNA sampling
is an important point of discussion.
2. Law Enforcement Perceptions
The Pool court’s summation that “[t]here is no evidence that an oral swab [to
obtain a DNA sample] is any more physically invasive than taking fingerprints”119
ignores these substantial and undeniable differences between DNA and fingerprint
evidence, as well as the concerns raised by Cole.  The court wrote off concerns of “Big
Brother” persecution based on genetic characteristics as “theoretically possible” but
unlikely based on the debatable “junk DNA” contention.120
Even granting the premise that DNA samples may contain more personal infor-
mation than mere personal identification information, the court in Pool pronounced its
trust that DNA samples would not be misused based on criminal penalties built into
the statute aimed at punishing such misuse.121  This troubling idealism and faith in the
system ignores a long history of abuses of police records,122 and it fails to recognize the
116 See Elizabeth E. Joh, Essay, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and
Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (2006). But see D. H. Kaye, Science Fiction and
Shed DNA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 62 (2006), http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/
main/2006/12/science_fiction.html (replying to Joh, supra). Joh and Kaye debate the merits
of the “junk DNA” argument. To avoid simply rehashing the argument, this Note focuses on
the perceptions of genetic value DNA evidence carries, and assumes merely that there is poten-
tial for DNA samples to be used improperly based on this perception.
117 Simon A. Cole, Is the “Junk” DNA Designation Bunk?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY
54 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/23/lrcoll2007n23cole.pdf.
118 Id.
119 United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903, 911 (E.D. 2009), aff’d, 2010 WL 3554049 (9th
Cir. Sept. 14, 2010). The Ninth Circuit echoed this “physically invasive” argument, and con-
cluded that, while DNA evidence may be more revealing of various personal characteristics,
the government is only lawfully authorized to look for mere identity. United States v. Pool, 2010
WL 3554049 at *7–8 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2010).
120 Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d. at 912.
121 Id.
122 A 1974 law review article noted that abuses of confidential arrest information were ram-
pant, including unauthorized disclosure to employers, private entities, and unauthorized govern-
ment personnel. Andrew L. Gates III, Comment, Arrest Records—Protecting the Innocent,
48 TUL. L. REV. 629, 632 (1974). “This widespread accessibility to records has prompted one
commentator to write that ‘any private investigator worthy of the name can get access to the
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added threat of abuse inherent with DNA samples.  If there is any truth—or even any
societal perception of truth—to the suggestion that “the advance of science promises
to make stored DNA only more revealing in time,”123 then it follows that stored DNA
would become proportionately more valuable, making criminal penalties prohibiting
misuse a less persuasive deterrent.124
Perhaps most importantly, the Pool court failed to recognize the legitimate sug-
gestion that any whiff of predictive value within the DNA could contaminate the
identification process125 or the investigative process as a whole. Local and federal
forensic labs tout certain safeguards to avoid misuse of DNA samples and the poten-
tial for faulty reliance on DNA’s predictive value, most notably a federal policy that
DNA matches through the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) will not
include personal criminal history information.126  Thus, when a “cold hit” match is
made through the national database, analysts see only the identity match, not the
criminal background of the individual or any other personal information.127  But is this
“safeguard” more or less helpful in securing an uncorrupted investigation?
3. Something to Fear, Even With Nothing to Hide
Imagine an innocent man—who we, as a culture, agree should have nothing to
fear—arrested erroneously, processed and forced to give a DNA sample.  This sample
is run through CODIS,128 and matched with DNA found on the edge of a glass at the
scene of a gruesome rape and murder.  This individual may have a perfectly legitimate
explanation—the victim was a friend, they visited one another frequently—not to
mention an airtight alibi.  But none of this information, nor the details of the errone-
ous underlying arrest, is available to the technician, who is merely thrilled to have
information . . . .’” Id. (quoting Kenneth L. Karst, “The Files”: Legal Controls Over the
Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 342,
365 (1966)).
123 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 842 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 544 U.S. 924 (2005).
124 Even if DNA does not prove, over time, to be more scientifically revealing, the enduring
cultural perceptions of its scientific potential should ensure that its perceived value remains high.
125 If fingerprints were merely believed to contain some sort of identifying information about
an individual’s race, hereditary history, or criminal propensities, this perception could corrupt the
identification process. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES, supra note 10, at 101. If, for instance, an
examiner was told a suspect was of a certain race, that examiner would be more inclined to find
a match based on the characteristics of that race. Id. Because fingerprints contain no such
information, examiners need focus only on a pure identification match. Id. However even the
perceived enhanced evidentiary value of DNA evidence, can create similar concerns. Id.
126 DNA FORENSICS, supra note 80, at 12.
127 Id.
128 CODIS collects DNA samples from state and local law enforcement, runs the samples
through the national database, and reports any matches back to local law enforcement. Id. at 8.
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gotten a “cold hit.”129  The news of the “cold hit” is forwarded to police investigating
the murder,130 who have been at a standstill with no viable suspects.  Will the innocent
man’s alibi and explanation, his sterling record, eventually come to the forefront?  We
should certainly hope so.  Still, basic human intuition suggests that, before the inno-
cent man is exonerated, the investigating officers could allow the fortuitous “cold
hit” to cloud their assessment of this exculpatory information,131 prompting them to
push for an investigation that would be harmful to both the individual and the pursuit
of justice.132
The Department of Justice lists four ways in which DNA evidence can be collected
by law enforcement: 1) through voluntary submission when an individual, for instance,
wishes to rule himself out as a suspect in a crime; 2) through a court order when the
judge deems there to be reasonable cause to take a sample from a suspect; 3) after aban-
donment, like when a suspect leaves a cigarette behind and law enforcement collects
it; and 4) based on a statute such as a pre-conviction DNA testing statute.133  Under the
first three methods of collection, the individual in the hypothetical above would have
already been a subject in the investigators’ case, meaning the exculpatory information
would be plain to police long before any match was made to DNA on a glass.  Only
under the fourth method is the individual not already “in the case,”134 and only under
129 The “hit” provides reasonable cause for law enforcement to collect a follow-up, com-
parative DNA sample to confirm the accuracy of CODIS. Id.
130 See id.
131 Simon Cole expressed a similar concern with arrestee DNA sampling, noting that a DNA
sample in a database offers no information regarding racial or geographical biases and there-
fore becomes “laundered” of other potentially relevant information, and treated by law en-
forcement as “objective information imbued with the considerable authority of science.” Cole,
Fingerprint Identification, supra note 15, at 83.
132 Ironically, the reverse of this scenario—prosecutors allowing one seemingly intractable
piece of evidence to block out significant evidence to the contrary, including exculpatory DNA
evidence—played out in the office of one of the country’s most ardent DNA sampling advo-
cates. Felch & Dolan, supra note 114. When investigators and DNA lab technicians used a
DNA sample to rule out the prosecutors’ primary suspect, prosecutors, convinced of the sus-
pect’s guilt by eyewitness identification, pressured the DNA technicians to amend their report.
Id. When the technicians refused, prosecutors pursued the case anyway, pushing the suspect
to accept a plea agreement and two years in jail. Id. Eight months later, the DNA from the crime
was definitively matched to another individual, who confessed to the crime. Id.
133 DNA FORENSICS, supra note 80, at 7.
134 In 1917, a New York court rejected an argument that submitting to fingerprinting
amounted to self-incrimination, hinging its decision on the fact that the “defendant was already
in the case.” People v. Sallow, 165 N.Y.S. 915, 924 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1917). This language
is clearly a harbinger of the type of language common to Fourth Amendment arguments today,
but it also speaks to the basic issue suggested in the hypothetical above. Had the innocent man
been “in the [murder-rape] case” to begin with, self-incrimination would not be an issue. But be-
cause he was completely unknown to law enforcement prior to the DNA match, he finds himself
wrongfully incriminated based in part on this lack of involvement as a suspect to this point.
2010] FAULTY FOUNDATIONS 495
the fourth method could investigative process be so gravely corrupted by a false sense
of the value of the DNA match. None of this is to say that “cold hits” leading to con-
victions are not valid; they have been undeniably helpful to successful prosecutions.
But the sheer weight of perceived infallibility these hits carry creates the potential for
a corruption of the investigative process.135
4. Community Perceptions
Based on the history of court rulings on routine fingerprinting, concerns about
perceptions of examiners and investigators can easily be extended to community
perceptions related to DNA testing.  Throughout the first half of the twentieth
century, a number of courts grappled with whether persons arrested and subsequently
exonerated had a right to retrieve their arrest records, including photographs and
fingerprints.136  Although many courts showed deference to the judgment of law
enforcement in refusing to expunge the records,137 a distinct line of cases expressed
serious concerns with the privacy intrusions inherent in such actions.  These courts
based this early finding of a privacy interest on the proposition that mere presence
in a police “rogues’ gallery” was an unacceptable encroachment on the dignity of
an unconvicted individual.138
In a routine fingerprinting case, State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, the Indiana Supreme
Court allowed the retention of booking materials, namely photographs and fingerprints,
after acquittal over the protestations of the individual.139  The court echoed the familiar
argument that individuals must suffer “indignities” such as fingerprinting for the benefit
135 Cole suggested that, while a detailed criminal and arrest history creates a nuanced portrait
of an individual’s potential dangerousness, a DNA sample in a database takes on an air of
“neutral authority,” which can lead to false assumptions by law enforcement. Cole, Fingerprint
Identification, supra note 15, at 83.
136 Most jurisdictions have since responded to this question by passing laws allowing arrest
files, including fingerprints, to be expunged upon the request of the individual. See, e.g., WIS.
STAT. § 165.84(1) (2008) (“Any person arrested or taken into custody and subsequently released
without charge, or cleared of the offense through court proceedings, shall have any finger-
print record taken in connection therewith returned upon request.”).
137 See, e.g., Herschel v. Dyra, 365 F.2d 17, 20 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 973
(1966) (finding that, absent legislative instruction to the contrary, police officials have the right
to maintain arrest records of individuals against whom all charges had been dropped).
138 See State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 66 N.E.2d 755, 761 (Ind. 1946); Itzkovitch v.
Whitaker, 42 So. 228, 229 (La. 1906) (finding that maintaining individual’s photograph, without
conviction, would be “permanent proof of dishonesty”); State ex rel. Reed v. Harris, 153 S.W.2d
834, 837 (Mo. 1941) (limiting law enforcement’s ability to disseminate fingerprint records to
untold “rogues’ galleries” across the country); see also, Eddy v. Moore, 487 P.2d 211, 216
(Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (finding “a direct correlation between the loss of individual privacy and
the retention of arrest records”).
139 Mavity, 66 N.E.2d at 762–63.
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of society.140  But the Mavity court also found that the display of the individual’s photo-
graph in a “rogues’ gallery” of arrested individuals, which created a perception of guilt,
took the indignity too far by creating an infringement on the individual’s privacy.141
The Mavity court’s focus on the “indignity” of fingerprinting is particularly telling
as it relates to the difference in character between DNA evidence and fingerprints.  The
court noted that, because fingerprinting had become a mainstream form of identifi-
cation used for civil service purposes, identification for passports and identification
at hospitals, the potential “indignity” was relatively minimal.142  DNA evidence has
no such practical, everyday applications.143  In fact, it seems safe to assume that most
people would balk at providing a DNA sample for some civil purpose, precisely be-
cause of the growing and unshakeable perception that DNA can unlock countless
genetic secrets.144
If the indignity of fingerprinting is tempered by the use of fingerprinting in other
walks of life, and the certainty that prints will reveal only so much, DNA sampling
must, by its nature, be considered a higher level of indignity and thus a greater privacy
intrusion.  To subject an individual to DNA sampling upon arrest is to subject that
person to a process that is reserved, at least in the common perception, solely for
criminals.145  That DNA is used most commonly, both in the public perception and
in reality, to detect more heinous crimes such as rape and murder also speaks to this
negative perception.146
140 See id. at 761 (noting that the arrest process is a “humiliation” to which a potentially in-
nocent arrestee “must submit for the benefit of society”).
141 Id. at 762.
142 Id. at 760. This argument, that fingerprinting is too common to cause serious indignity, has
been echoed in the debate over mandatory fingerprinting of schoolteachers. See, e.g., Christina
Buschmann, Mandatory Fingerprinting of Public School Teachers: Facilitating Background
Checks or Infringing on Individuals’ Constitutional Rights?, 11 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J.
1273, 1280–81 (2003).
143 New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s suggestion of an employment-based com-
pulsory DNA sampling program was rejected despite evidence that it would have seriously aided
efforts at identifying illegal immigrants. Critics of the plan argued that it would not take long
for the samples to be used in all aspects of government. See Jim Dwyer, License, Registration,
and DNA, Please, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008, at B1.
144 See Singer et al., supra note 111, at 114–15 (discussing the “CSI effect,” or the impact
popular culture has had on the perception that DNA evidence is infallible and easily obtained
and tested).
145 Buschmann notes that “the process of fingerprinting is not required for an accurate back-
ground check unless the applicant is lying about his or her name or other identifying informa-
tion.” Buschmann, supra note 142, at 1282. Regardless of the pervasiveness of fingerprinting in
the civil context, the process still involves a suspicion of criminality and a suggestion that an
aspiring teacher would even consider lying, which is a clear “insult to [teachers’] character.” Id.
If the purpose, both perceived and practical, of DNA testing in fact has little to do with estab-
lishing identity, and more to do with solving past crimes, the “insult” becomes more severe.
146 See DNA FORENSICS, supra note 80, at 9 (noting an emphasis on violent crimes in the
DNA identification context).
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5. Conclusions—Comparing the “Intrusion” of DNA and Fingerprints
While scientists debate the relative value of DNA samples, the mere potential for
DNA samples to contain personal genetic information seems enough to draw a sig-
nificant distinction between DNA sampling and fingerprinting.147  Even those in favor
of the “junk DNA” distinction acknowledge that DNA sampling may carry significant
Fourth Amendment implications,148 and even courts upholding post-conviction DNA
statutes have expressed concern about the intrusion implicit in the potential of DNA.149
Even granting the “junk DNA” argument, or simply reserving judgment on the
potential of DNA until it has been fully hashed out by scientists, the broad cultural per-
ceptions surrounding DNA evidence are unlikely to dissipate.  As a culture, we see
DNA evidence as a miraculous science capable of exposing untold individual truths and
as a law enforcement tool reserved for solving the most heinous crimes.  While suf-
fering the “indignity” of DNA sampling may seem trivial to some, that issue has been
a key question in courts’ consideration of fingerprinting.  Moreover, law enforcement
is not immune from these same cultural intuitions.  If anything, the promise of DNA
databases—the thrill of a cold hit—has more potential to cloud the judgment of law
enforcement, by corrupting the investigative process and identifying a prime suspect
who was previously not even “in the case.”
In short, the comparison between DNA sampling and fingerprinting for purposes
of establishing an acceptable “intrusion” rings false.  Based on the substantial scientific
differences and the legitimate public perception differences between DNA evidence
and fingerprints, it seems clear that routine DNA sampling requires stricter scrutiny
than a mere presumption of a “natural progression” from fingerprinting.  Part III of
this Note will argue that this false assumption, in the context of both the “need” and
the “intrusion” prongs of Fourth Amendment analysis, significantly undermines the
analysis of rulings upholding pre-conviction DNA sampling.
III. APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCEPTION TESTS
Accepting the argument posited in Part II of this Note—that the assumption of a
legitimate legal analogy between pre-conviction fingerprinting and DNA sampling is
false—is this failed analogy enough to make a case that pre-conviction DNA sampling
statutes are unconstitutional?  Because DNA sampling is undeniably a “search”
147 Kaye, supra note 116, at 64. Kaye, defending the “junk DNA” argument, acknowledges
that in time scientists may be able to trace alleles in DNA that signify personal information such
as risk factors. Id. at 67. His emphasis is on debunking the criticism that warrantless DNA
collection would lead to a government database of critical personal information. Id. at 63–64.
148 Id. at 67.
149 See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 842 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J., con-
curring), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 924 (2005).
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under the Fourth Amendment,150 an affirmative showing of unconstitutionality is not
necessary.  The State, in advocating this acknowledged intrusion upon personal privacy,
bears the burden of proving that the intrusion is “reasonable.”151  And without the con-
venient, but faulty, precedent of fingerprinting, making that case for reasonableness
would seem exponentially more difficult under both the totality of circumstances and
the special needs tests.
A. The Totality of Circumstances Framework in Pool and Mitchell
The “reasonableness” of a search under the totality of circumstances test is deter-
mined by weighing the degree to which the search “intrudes upon an individual’s
privacy” against the “degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate gov-
ernmental interests.”152  The Pool court used this exact standard and relied heavily on
the precedential value of fingerprinting to inform both sides of the totality of circum-
stances balancing test.
Regarding the privacy intrusion represented in DNA sampling, the Pool court’s
faulty reliance on fingerprinting leads more to a severe understatement of the intrusion
rather than a blatant misstatement.  The court used the buzzwords “technical progres-
sion” when comparing DNA evidence to fingerprints,153 but glossed over the significant
privacy concerns raised by this “progression.”154  Rather than acknowledging the poten-
tial that DNA samples could contain limitless private information beyond mere identity,
the Pool court suggests that the stated goal of DNA sampling—basic identification, a
la fingerprinting—is evidence enough of the process’s limits.155  Because fingerprinting
has always been primarily about assuring identification, the Pool court argued, DNA
evidence is bound to do the same.156  Conversely, the Mitchell court, which found the
same federal statute unconstitutional,157 noted that the “oversimplification” of the rela-
tionship between fingerprinting and DNA sampling “ignores the complex, compre-
hensive, inherently private information contained in a DNA sample.”158
150 See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying discussion.
151 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting against “unreasonable searches and seizures”);
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990) (describing the State’s burden).
152 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (upholding the warrantless search of a
probationer by his probation officer).
153 United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903, 910 (E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 2010 WL 3554049
(9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2010).
154 Id. at 912 (discussing junk DNA, suggesting that criminal penalties are enough to avoid
civil liberty concerns).
155 Id. at 910.
156 Id.
157 The Mitchell court dealt specifically with the amended DNA Fingerprinting Act, 42
U.S.C. §14135a (2006), which gave the Attorney General authority to collect DNA samples from
arrested individuals. United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
158 Id. at 608.
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The Mitchell court also took issue with the other primary argument in Pool for
the “minimal intrusion” of DNA sampling: the idea that arrestees enjoy a lesser privacy
interest than everyday citizens.159  The Pool court based its finding of a minimal intru-
sion on the premise that arrestees have a diminished privacy right, and based this prem-
ise on the historical analogy to fingerprinting.160  The argument in Pool, essentially, is
that fingerprinting already represents an acceptable infringement on an arrestee’s rights,
and thus this diminished privacy interest can extend to DNA testing as well.161
The Mitchell court directly countered Pool by emphasizing that the substantial
potential intrusion DNA sampling represents seriously outweighs the intrusion of
fingerprinting, and thus a mere arrestee should have no diminished expectation of
privacy.162  Furthermore, the Mitchell court acknowledged a diminished privacy interest
in a pretrial detainee, an individual against whom there has been a judicial finding of
probable cause.163  However, the court stressed that any curbing of that detainee’s pri-
vacy expectation must serve a legitimate penological interest;164 otherwise, his privacy
rights should retain a presumption of innocence, particularly considering the privacy
interests at stake.165
While the exact privacy interests of arrested individuals will likely need to be delin-
eated further by the courts, clearly the argument for a minimal intrusion in Pool suffers
because of the faulty fingerprint analogy.  Even if the Pool court merely understated
the significant privacy intrusion DNA sampling represents, where would the court’s
argument be without the faulty logic that DNA sampling is just the next step—and no
more intrusive—than fingerprinting?  Aside from a paragraph about the relative ease
of buccal swabbing,166 the Pool court has little to base its conclusion on absent the
fingerprinting analogy.
Similarly, the Pool court’s consideration of the legitimate government interest
prong of the totality of circumstances test is wholly reliant on a favorable, and flawed,
comparison with fingerprinting.  The court cited United States v. Kelly, implying that
159 United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903, 910 (E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 2010 WL 3554049
(9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2010).
160 Id. at 910–11.
161 This argument in Pool also spills over into the discussion of the “need” element of totality
of circumstances analysis. The Pool court’s finding of a diminished right is based on the as-
sumption that, once arrested, a suspect’s “identification becomes a matter of legitimate state
interest and he can hardly claim privacy in it.” Id. at 911. This argument depends on the
assumption that DNA sampling is a necessary and enhanced way of definitively determining
an individual’s identity.
162 Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 608–09.
163 Id. at 606–07. This moment—the finding of probable cause—is the “watershed” moment
for a significantly lessened privacy interest, according to the Pool court. Pool, 645 F. Supp.
2d at 909.
164 Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
165 Id. at 606–07.
166 Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 911.
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if fingerprinting was a permissible “extension of methods of identification”167 beyond,
presumably, the Bertillon method, a further extension to DNA sampling should be simi-
larly permissible.168  This argument fails to acknowledge that, in terms of the adminis-
trative goal of fingerprinting upon arrest to verify identity, DNA evidence is not so
much a “progression” as it is an alternate way to meet that aim.  The court attempts
to argue that DNA can offer more “precision” in determining identity,169 but it makes
no claim that fingerprinting is not fully adequate in that regard.  Furthermore, it ignores
the fact that, if anything, DNA used solely for identification purposes would be less
reliable.  Not only has it been proven that DNA samples can be falsified, but DNA data-
bases are significantly smaller than fingerprint databases,170 and are likely to remain
so as long as a public stigma remains against DNA testing.171
Again, lacking the assistance of the faulty fingerprinting analogy, the rationale
in Pool is significantly undermined in the “need” context.  Without the benefit of the
presumption of a permissible “technological progression,” the “need” prong in Pool
becomes an argument for a government interest merely in further expansion of DNA
databases by whatever means possible.  While the practical law enforcement benefits
of this “need” are undeniable,172 the question becomes whether this government interest
is legitimate and substantial enough to outweigh the significant privacy interests being
infringed upon.
Absent the reliance on the false fingerprinting analogy, the answer in Pool would
have to be “no.”  The Pool court, in relying on this false equivalency, seriously mini-
mized the intrusion on privacy rights and plainly misstated an argument for precedent
in terms of the countervailing government interest.  With no precedent to fall back on,
the argument for an unprecedented and broad government interest would seem to be
outweighed by a more substantial intrusion as expressed in Mitchell.  Therefore, a to-
tality of circumstances test for pre-conviction DNA evidence would likely fail.
B. Imagining a Special Needs Argument
The special needs test for determining if a warrantless search is “reasonable” re-
quires a showing that “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
167 Id. at 912–13 (citing United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 68–69 (2nd Cir. 1932)).
168 Id. at 913.
169 Id. at 910 (quoting Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 1992)).
170 According to the FBI, the IAFIS system for fingerprints contains roughly sixty-six million
fingerprint cards, FBI IAFIS, supra note 77, while the CODIS system has no more than nine
million DNA profiles. CODIS-NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.
fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited Nov. 17, 2010).
171 See supra note 146 and accompanying text (discussing a negative public perception in
that DNA sampling is used most commonly to detect more heinous crimes).
172 The basic, intuitive argument that expanded DNA databases will lead to more solved
crimes will be addressed in Part IV of this Note.
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make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.”173  The phrase,
“beyond the normal need for law enforcement” has been somewhat ill-defined, but
recent case law has honed the definition of a “special need” to be a need that does not
involve a “general interest in crime control.”174  Julie Rikelman, who litigated a seminal
special needs case, Ferguson v. City of Charleston,175 described the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Ferguson as having delineated at least three “disqualifiers” for applying a
special needs exception: “1) significant law enforcement involvement; 2) a primary
law enforcement purpose; and 3) the use of normal law enforcement sanctions . . . to
further the regime’s stated goals.”176
Under this basic framework, it is not impossible to imagine an argument for routine
fingerprinting as a “special need,” although the test was developed long after finger-
printing had been deemed routine.177  While there is significant law enforcement in-
volvement with the process of fingerprinting, the primary purpose could be described
as more administrative than investigative, and any “sanctions” are merely incidental,
rather than central, to the primary goal of definitive identification.  Thus, if a valid case
could be made that DNA sampling serves a similar administrative purpose, a special
needs argument might also be tenable.  However, as this Note has argued,178 any pro-
posed administrative purpose for routine arrestee DNA sampling is undermined by the
fact that the administrative need is already being met by routine fingerprinting.
Still, if the faulty fingerprinting precedent is removed from the totality of circum-
stances equation, and the argument for government need in Pool can be whittled down
to an interest in simply expanding DNA databases, a special needs argument might
seem appealing to proponents of pre-conviction DNA sampling.  The problem is de-
fining a need that reflects something other than a general law enforcement interest. 
Courts upholding post-conviction DNA sampling statutes have suggested that these
statutes meet a “special need” because law enforcement is not in the midst of a specific
investigation, but rather collecting information for a broader, generalized law enforce-
ment purpose.179  As the Second Circuit in United States v. Amerson put it:
173 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
174 Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979)) (finding vehicle checkpoints aimed at uncovering illegal drug
activity unconstitutional).
175 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
176 Julie Rikelman, Justifying Forcible DNA Testing Schemes Under the Special Needs
Exception to the Fourth Amendment: A Dangerous Precedent, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 41, 55
(2007). Rikelman’s article argues that the “special needs” exception to suspicion-less searches
cannot apply to searches aimed at uncovering ordinary criminal conduct. Id.
177 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (recognizing the special needs exception).
178 See supra Part II.A.2.
179 See, e.g., United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S.
1042 (2007); United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S.
1343 (2007).
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The taking of DNA samples, unlike a normal law enforcement
investigation, does not involve any suggestion that the individual
is being suspected of having committed a crime (other than the one
of which he had already been convicted). Nor does it force the indi-
vidual to provide evidence to exonerate herself from a crime in
which the government had no reason to think she was involved.180
Thus, the argument in Amerson and similar cases is an inversion of the individualized
suspicion requirement.  Because there is no individualized suspicion involved in DNA
sampling, Amerson contends, the process does not serve a typical law enforcement
interest, but rather serves a special need.181
But this argument is not without significant holes.  The Amerson court based its
proposition regarding the special need of law enforcement to gather “information”182
on a case that allowed the suspicion-less stopping of vehicles to aid in the investiga-
tion of a fatal accident.183  The Amerson court used this case to contend that the first
“disqualifier” proposed by Rikelman, law enforcement involvement, is void.184  How-
ever, the two other “disqualifiers,” a primary law enforcement purpose and the use
of normal law enforcement sanctions to further the program’s stated goals,185 remain
unrefuted and would be exceedingly difficult to counter.186
Ironically, the one alternative rationale occasionally suggested is a special need
to pursue personal liberty.187  The State could argue that its “special need” is an
interest in diligently pursuing exoneration of the wrongfully convicted by growing
the DNA databases.188  Of course, this argument is upended by the extensive case
law suggesting a clear law enforcement interest,189 and a similarly extensive history
180 Amerson, 483 F.3d at 82 (noting that DNA sampling also involves no law enforcement
discretion over who is and is not subjected to testing).
181 Id.
182 An argument that certainly sounds like one that would be made in a hypothetical
routine fingerprinting special needs case.
183 Amerson, 483 F.3d at 80 (citing Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004)).
184 Id.
185 Rikelman, supra note 176, at 55.
186 See United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 604–06 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (arguing
that a special needs analysis is inappropriate in the context of DNA sampling because of the
clear general law enforcement interest).
187 See Deborah F. Barfield, Comment, DNA Fingerprinting—Justifying the Special Need
for the Fourth Amendment’s Intrusion into the Zone of Privacy, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 27
(2000), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v6i5/note2.html.
188 See id.
189 See Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 657 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that New York State’s
intent for the DNA database would be “to maintain information available to solve future
crimes.” (quoting Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999)), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 953
(2006); United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315, 323 (D. Del. 2003) (“[T]he ultimate
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of states’ preventing, not encouraging,190 the diligent pursuit of exoneration with
DNA evidence.191
Ultimately, a special needs analysis for DNA sampling has been rejected as inap-
propriate,192 particularly in the absence of any articulated need that does not involve
the second and third “disqualifiers” described by Rikelman.193  Even if an argument
could be made that DNA is a superior method of simple identification194 and that a
need still exists for an administrative process of definitively determining the identity
of arrested individuals,195 there is far too much evidence of an emphasis on expand-
ing DNA databases to aid the common law enforcement purpose of solving and
punishing crimes.
C. Conclusions—The Fourth Amendment Tests
If we take away the faulty rationale that DNA sampling upon arrest is analogous
to, or a natural extension of, routine fingerprinting, statutes mandating arrestee DNA
sampling are clearly unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.  Under a totality
of circumstances analysis, the weight tilts considerably towards the rights of the in-
dividual when the substantive differences between DNA evidence and fingerprints are
adequately considered.196  Moreover, when the legitimate government need is stripped
of any pretext that DNA sampling is a mere extension of fingerprinting’s legitimate
administrative goals, what remains is a broad and unprecedented government rationale
that seriously threatens individual privacy.
Meanwhile, a “special needs” analysis also suffers from the lack of a strong corre-
lation, beyond mere intuition, between DNA sampling and fingerprinting.  If a “special
need” under the Fourth Amendment exception requires a purpose other than a general
law enforcement goal, the argument for an administrative purpose is prohibited by the
fact that this goal is already being met by fingerprinting.197  Furthermore, both the gov-
ernment and supportive courts have made it clear that a critical goal of DNA sampl-
ing is expanding DNA databases in order to solve crimes.  The lack of any quality
goals of solving past and future criminal investigations, exonerating the innocent and deterring
recidivism.”), aff’d, 402 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006).
190 See, e.g., District Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
191 As Barfield notes, “accompanying the statutory requirement that an individual provide
a DNA sample, there should be an automatic right to its analysis and a guarantee that the sample
will be used to ensure the conclusiveness of the conviction—even if the deadline for an appeal
has passed.” Barfield, supra note 187.
192 See United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 604–05 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
193 See Rikelman, supra note 176, at 55.
194 Which, to date, it cannot. See supra Part II.B.
195 Which, to date, it does not. Id.
196 See Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 608–09 (recognizing that DNA extraction is “much
more than a mere progression”).
197 See supra Part II.A.2.
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argument that such a goal does not serve a general law enforcement purpose suggests
that a special needs analysis is wholly inappropriate for this question.
All of that said, the intuitive cultural response to such constitutional pronounce-
ments remains attractively straightforward: “So what?”  For all the discussion about
an historic need for fingerprinting, there is currently an FBI database containing sixty-
six million prints198 capable of being searched in a matter of minutes199—why would
we not extend this same capability to an even more powerful form of evidence, DNA? 
The case for this intuition, which should not be dismissed, gets stronger with each rape
and murder, many of which DNA sampling advocates claim could have been prevented
with a broader DNA database.200  The Justice Department claims that collecting sam-
ples from offenders who commit minor crimes can lead to later convictions for major
crimes;201 why not increase the odds of solving murders and rapes by just folding ar-
restees into the database?202
That some courts will be inevitably swayed by the simplicity of this intuitive ar-
gument is only complicated by the fact that the intuition is, to some extent, increased
by a significant gap in case law surrounding fingerprinting as a law enforcement tool. 
Part IV of this Note will discuss these gaps, and address the arguments for arrestee
DNA sampling that will inevitably seek to exploit them.
IV. INFERRING PRECEDENT, FROM A LACK OF IT
This Note has, to this point, analyzed the comparison between routine finger-
printing and arrestee DNA sampling through the lens of a legal fiction: that routine
fingerprinting has been, or presumptively would be, deemed a constitutional exception
to Fourth Amendment protections.  That fingerprinting upon arrest has never been
subjected to the totality of circumstances or special needs tests unfortunately allows
advocates of arrestee DNA sampling a narrow avenue to exploit the intuitive rela-
tionship between fingerprints and DNA.  The lack of a clear and binding judicial
198 FBI IAFIS, supra note 77.
199 Id.
200 For instance, DNA Saves, a non-profit association that advocates for DNA arrestee sam-
pling, points to situations where individuals were arrested for petty crimes, released on bail or
acquittal, then went on to commit numerous violent crimes that could have been solved had a
DNA sample been taken upon the initial arrest. Why Pass This Law?, DNA SAVES, http://www
.dnasaves.org/dna_law.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2010). But see Haskell v. Brown, 677 F.
Supp. 2d 1187, 1201 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding the government’s argument that arrestee testing
would prevent future crimes to be unpersuasive, on the grounds that mandatory DNA sampling
upon conviction would have achieved the same results).
201 DNA FORENSICS, supra note 80, at 9.
202 Virginia’s Department of Forensic Sciences (DFS) boasts that the first “hit” on the state’s
arrestee database in 2003 occurred immediately after the upload of the first 80 arrestee DNA
samples into the database. DNA Databank Statistics, VA. DEP’T OF FORENSIC SCI., http://www
.dfs.virginia.gov/statistics/index.cfm (last visited Nov 17, 2010). Between 2003, when Virginia
began taking DNA samples from arrestees, and 2009, DFS reports 559 hits from arrestee sam-
ples, of the total 4,988 hits during that time period. Id.
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delineation of routine fingerprinting as a Fourth Amendment exception welcomes the
argument that fingerprinting represents more of an open door.  Because the constitu-
tional parameters of fingerprinting were never fully defined, the inclination is to de-
fine the parameters of DNA sampling based upon the enduring cultural intuitions that
allowed arrestee fingerprinting to become “routine.”203
This is undoubtedly the case with the diminished privacy interest theory promoted
in Pool.  The acceptance of arrestee fingerprinting as “routine” confirms the existence
of a diminished privacy interest for arrestees, but because the parameters of acceptable
diminishment have long gone undefined, the Pool court simply tailored its definition
to suit its needs.  An arrestee’s interest in privacy is diminished just enough, Pool im-
plies, to tilt the balance in a totality of circumstances test in the government’s favor.
Meanwhile, a California district court recently hinted at another mode of exploiting
the lack of strong fingerprinting case law, and adding weight to the government interest
side of the scale.204  The court in Haskell v. Brown, in rejecting a request for injunction
against the State’s arrestee DNA sampling law, expanded the definition of the govern-
ment’s interest in “identification” to include “both who that person is . . . and what that
person has done . . . .”205  The court based this finding not on precedent, but on the ab-
sence of it: “Plaintiffs could point the Court to no case holding that once an individual
has been identified through his fingerprints, the government was barred from running
those same fingerprints against crime scene samples for investigative purposes . . . .”206
Both these arguments—for a diminished privacy interest for arrestees, and an em-
bellished government interest in “identification”—essentially discern precedent from
a marked lack of precedent.  While this method seems on its face to be judicially sus-
pect, it is also undermined by the extensive documentary, if not legally binding, history
of routine fingerprinting.
A. The Diminished Privacy Interest Argument
Despite scholarly presumptions to the contrary,207 the Pool court’s suggestion of
a diminished privacy interest208 seems all but certain to play a critical role in the debate
203 In a concurrence to the Ninth Circuit opinion affirming the District Court in Pool, Judge
Lucero hinted at this attitude, noting that, “[a]lthough the historical basis for allowing finger-
printing is not entirely clear, the near universal acceptance of the practice casts a long shadow
over this case.” United States v. Pool, 2010 WL 3554049 at *14 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2010)
(Lucero, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
204 Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
205 Id. at 1199.
206 Id. at 1199–1200.
207 Rikelman draws the logical conclusion that, because all jurisdictions have upheld post-
conviction DNA statutes on a diminished expectation of privacy theory, DNA sampling of ar-
restees, who have no diminished expectation, should be presumptively prohibited. Rikelman,
supra note 176, at 75–76.
208 See United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903, 909–10 (E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 2010
WL 3554049 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2010).
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over arrestee DNA sampling.  That said, the argument has been effectively rebutted
by both courts that have ruled against arrestee DNA sampling.
For instance, in contrast to the approach in Pool, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
rejected a pre-conviction DNA statute209 in In re Welfare of C.T.L. by emphasizing the
distinction between a person’s rights prior to conviction and post-conviction.210  The
C.T.L. court opted not to draw any comparisons to fingerprinting, instead reasoning
that the Minnesota statute’s requirement that a DNA sample be destroyed when an
individual is acquitted suggests a legislative intent to protect the Fourth Amendment
rights of persons who have not been found legally guilty.211  Consequently, the court
reasoned, the presumption of innocence of an accused individual should protect him
from the “search” inherent in DNA sampling absent individualized suspicion.212
The Mitchell court, meanwhile, criticized Pool specifically for advocating an
erosion of the presumption of innocence, the “moral polestar of our criminal justice
system.”213  And while the Mitchell court accepted Pool’s premise to a degree, acknowl-
edging that a pretrial detainee has a diminished privacy interest, it stressed that any
intrusions on privacy must be based on a penological interest.214
That distinction in Mitchell is critical, as it helps refute the suggestion in Pool
that mandating DNA testing of arrestees is akin to restricting travel for flight risks or
prohibiting certain activities for alleged sex offenders as conditions of pretrial re-
lease.215  The problem with this analogy is that we do not mandate that all arrested
individuals stay 100 yards from playgrounds.  These pre-trial privacy restrictions
suggested in Pool are based on individualized findings by the court, which are
founded on public safety and administrative concerns.216  These pre-trial restrictions
require precisely the sort of individualized suspicion that DNA sampling statutes
admittedly circumvent.
B. Expanding Government’s “Identification” Interest
In expanding the definition of the government’s interest in “identification” to
include a broad, open-ended investigatory interest,217 the court in Haskell tapped into
209 MINN. STAT. § 299C.105 (2009).
210 In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
211 Id. at 491–92.
212 Id.
213 United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 606 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
214 Id. at 607.
215 United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903, 909 (E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 2010 WL 3554049
(9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2010). Interestingly, the Pool court argued that because these conditions are
identical in nature and purpose to conditions of probation, and because DNA sampling has been
upheld for probationers, then sampling should be upheld for arrestees, ignoring, again, the
minor difference of a criminal conviction. Id.
216 To extend the logic of Mitchell, these conditions embody a “penological interest,” but in
a pre-trial release context. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
217 Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1199 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (ruling that the interest
in “identification” includes what an individual has done, including past, unsolved, crimes).
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one of the most basic intuitions fueling the fingerprinting/DNA sampling analogy. 
The court’s reframing of the interest involved—from an unprecedentedly broad law
enforcement hammer, to a mere extension of a process that has been in place for de-
cades—is particularly potent because it is undeniably true.  Few courts have challenged
the expansion of arrestee fingerprinting from an administrative need to a law enforce-
ment tool.218  However, while a full reading of the history of fingerprinting confirms
that many courts have been vulnerable to cultural intuitions, society has consistently
rejected collection of fingerprints for a broad, suspicion-less, investigatory purpose.
Routine fingerprinting was undeniably instituted as an exception based on a dire
need, but as that need diminished219 and the whispers of a powerful law enforcement
tool grew,220 courts did not take notable steps to limit or define that exception but rather
just accepted it as “routine.”221  Part of the reason for this may have been that, despite
the whispers and occasional braggadocio222 regarding fingerprinting as a law enforce-
ment mechanism, those hopes for fingerprinting did not come into fruition until the late-
1980s with major advances in computer technology.223  But law enforcement interest
in expanding fingerprinting databases, no matter how technically lacking, was overt as
far back as 1930, when a fingerprint expert declared that, “Universal Finger Printing
is coming.  How soon I cannot say. But it is being agitated on all sides.”224  That
“agitation” continued through the 1930s and 1940s, when J. Edgar Hoover pushed hard
for universal fingerprinting with campaign-like fervor,225 and two bills mandating uni-
versal fingerprinting were brought before Congress.226
218 See infra, note 236 and accompanying text (discussing one notable case that pointedly
rebutted a broad law enforcement intent).
219 See COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES, supra note 10, at 249 (discussing the effect imple-
mentation of social security numbers in 1935 had on the need for fingerprinting).
220 See COOKE, supra note 91, at 18–19 (using the same “habitual criminal” rationale for
increased, even universal, fingerprinting, that is being used by the Justice Department to
support increased DNA sampling today); see also DNA FORENSICS, supra note 80, at 9 (noting
some of the success of DNA sampling).
221 In 1941, even in the absence of statutory authority for routine fingerprinting, one arrestee
seeking to enjoin law enforcement officials from forwarding fingerprints and arrest information
to other agencies, did not bother to challenge the routine collection itself. See State ex rel. Reed
v. Harris, 153 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Mo. 1941).
222 Cooke boasted that fingerprint technicians could process and identify a previously un-
identified set of prints “in an average of three minutes. Think of that!” COOKE, supra note 91,
at 17–18.
223 See COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES, supra note 10, at 257 (noting that the arrival of “inkless
fingerprinting” and “livescan” technology allowed police to scan fingerprints directly into a
computer, revolutionizing the possibilities of the AFIS system); see also, AFIS POLICY, supra
note 70, at 5 (noting that technological advancements in the 1980s allowed the AFIS to process
500-600 fingerprint files per second).
224 COOKE, supra note 91, at 26.
225 See COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES, supra note 10, at 247–48 (describing “I have been finger-
printed” buttons and decals for businesses reading “100% fingerprinted”).
226 Id. at 249.
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That both universal fingerprinting bills, and the efforts of Hoover, failed sug-
gests the limits of our cultural acceptance of fingerprinting.  Fingerprinting is fine for
criminals, and we intuitively accept its utility with arrested individuals, but we do not
accept the argument that we would all be better off if everyone were fingerprinted.227
Courts, in essence, have mirrored this cultural intuition.  While courts accepted
arrestee fingerprinting as “routine,” often citing the historical need argument,228 they
drew the line at any attempt to conduct a broad law enforcement search through ex-
panded access to fingerprints.
In Davis v. Mississippi,229 after a rape victim described her assailant as an African-
American youth, police rounded up dozens of local youth who met that profile, pro-
cessed them and took fingerprints until a match with a print on the victim’s window
was found.230  The Supreme Court ruled the fingerprint evidence inadmissible at trial
on the grounds that “[i]nvestigatory seizures would subject unlimited numbers of
innocent persons to the harassment and ignominy incident to involuntary detention.”231 
This intuition in Davis towards suppressing evidence that is gained from a broad
criminal investigative purpose,232 or searches lacking individualized suspicion, has
been consistently reaffirmed by the Court.233  For instance, programs aimed at discov-
ering criminal drug use among pregnant women and random traffic stops aimed at
uncovering drug trafficking were both overturned as unconstitutional because they
were blanket investigations aimed at uncovering ordinary crime.234
Of course, it must be acknowledged that none of the above situations involved an
individual against whom there has been a finding of probable cause for arrest, the cen-
tral prong of the argument in Pool.235  But in 1941, at the height of Hoover’s push for
227 Id. (“Though Americans were susceptible to demagoguery aimed at immigrants and
political dissidents, they remained steadfastly protective of their own privacy. Americans saw
the universal fingerprinting movement for what it was: an effort by the state to establish a com-
prehensive surveillance system over its own citizens.”).
228 See, e.g., McGovern v. Van Riper, 54 A.2d 469, 470–72 (N.J. Ch. 1947) (finding that the
primary goal in collecting fingerprints upon arrest was to definitively identify the individual
to determine if he had prior convictions, and to expedite recapture in case the individual were
to escape).
229 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
230 Id. at 722–23.
231 Id. at 727–28.
232 See also United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 2001) (finger-
printing conducted as part of blanket immigration investigation, rather than routine procedures
based on probable cause was inadmissible at trial); State v. Walls, 231 S.E.2d 196 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1977). But see Paulson v. State of Florida, 257 So. 2d 303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
(finding that, despite unlawful arrest, because intent of arrest was not to obtain fingerprints,
evidence was admissible).
233 See Rikelman, supra note 176, at 48.
234 See id. (citing Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2000); City of Indianapolis
v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000)).
235 United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903, 912 (E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 2010 WL 3554049
(9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2010).
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universal fingerprinting, the Missouri Supreme Court refused to recognize an implied
right of law enforcement to disseminate arrestee information to other agencies236 by
drawing a clear line between a convicted man and a man who has merely been arrested:
“[T]here is a marked difference between making an adequate record of the identity of
a person lawfully in custody . . . and the dissemination of the photographs and finger-
prints of an innocent person about whose identity there can be no question.”237
C. Conclusions: Exploiting the Gaps
It is hard to imagine a California district court in 2009 affording much weight to
a 1941 Missouri Supreme Court decision.  Still, Reed, and the extensive history of soci-
etal rejection of fingerprinting as an open-ended investigative tool, should at very least
give pause to courts intending to follow Haskell’s logic—or Pool’s, for that matter. 
The relative lack of jurisprudence discussing routine fingerprinting in a Fourth Amend-
ment context works both ways.  The myriad indicators of a societal, and occasionally
judicial, wariness of fingerprinting must carry at least as much weight as the lack of
judicial opinion to the contrary.  Moreover, as this Note has discussed at length, finger-
printing and DNA sampling are fundamentally different, making the leap from silent
judicial acquiescence to a fingerprinting exception to a binding judicial opinion on
DNA sampling all the more arduous.
CONCLUSION
The analogy between fingerprinting and DNA sampling is obvious and intuitive,
and has been used as a critical basis of support for arguments favoring expansion of
DNA sampling to include sampling from arrestees.  This Note has argued that this
analogy, in a precedential context, is false based on serious differences between the
underlying intents of routine fingerprinting and DNA sampling, and significant
substantive differences between the two types of evidence.
When the analogy between fingerprinting and DNA sampling is considered accu-
rately, the case for the constitutionality of arrestee DNA sampling under the Fourth
Amendment falls apart.  The significant intrusion on privacy rights inherent in DNA
sampling greatly outweighs the expressed government need, rendering arrestee
sampling unconstitutional under the totality of circumstances test.  Meanwhile, the
expressed need for DNA sampling is too obviously tied up in typical law enforce-
ment actions to qualify for consideration under the special needs test.
Admittedly, the development of routine fingerprinting from an administrative
need to a law enforcement tool has been historically under-examined by courts.  There
236 State ex rel. Reed v. Harris, 153 S.W.2d 834 (Mo. 1941). It must be acknowledged that
the Reed court’s decision was based on the lack of a statutory authorization for dissemination
of arrestee fingerprints. Id. at 837. Still, the sentiment in Reed is decidedly against a broad
investigatory intent.
237 Id.
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is no definitive case applying the totality of circumstances test because by the time
that test was announced, fingerprinting had long been informally deemed “routine.” 
While the strongest argument for arrestee DNA sampling would likely take advantage
of this vague judicial history, courts should acknowledge that creating precedent from
a lack of precedent is, for lack of a better term, bad precedent.
Ultimately, while the appeal of broad DNA databases and powerful law enforce-
ment capabilities is undeniable, the Fourth Amendment does not permit the encroach-
ment on individual privacy inherent in arrestee DNA sampling.  And although the
cultural intuitions supporting the law enforcement purposes are strong—not to mention
a natural progression from similar intuitions that led to a broad cultural acceptance
of routine fingerprinting—they remain, merely, intuitions.  Little in the history of rou-
tine fingerprinting suggests legitimate government authority to collect DNA samples
upon arrest.  On the contrary, this history begs for more discretion from modern judges,
and a substantial reigning-in of government overreach that seriously threatens funda-
mental privacy rights.  Thus, in accordance with, rather than in spite of, the history
of routine fingerprinting, arrestee DNA sampling statutes should be ruled unconsti-
tutional under the Fourth Amendment.
